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ABSTRACT
Although bitcoin emerged as a cryptocurrency relying on new
blockchain technology in 2009, it is still unclear how to regulate it.
The recent emergence of bitcoin futures poses a new level of risk
to the economy, again raising questions of regulation. This Article
examines the potential regulatory regime for bitcoin futures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A bit of science fiction became reality with the emergence of
cryptocurrencies. Bitcoin has dominated this landscape,
developing as a currency and, more recently, a futures product.1
The Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 2 launched trading
in bitcoin futures on December 10, 2017, and the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange Group (CME Group) did so a week later.3
Other exchanges are also considering offering bitcoin futures. 4
Bitcoin, as both a currency and a technology, has captivated
many people's attention and imagination since its emergence in
2009. As a result, much of the scholarship and debate have
focused on these aspects of bitcoin,5 but not much has been said
* Professor of Law, Indiana University McKinney School of Law.
1. See infra Parts II & III. However, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) rejected an application for a $100 million cryptocurrency Exchange Traded Fund
(ETF) in March 2017 and again in 2018 amid concerns, such as the lack of regulation. Stan
Higgins, Winklevoss Bitcoin ETF Offering Expands to $100 Million, COINDESK
(Feb. 9, 2017, 6:20 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/winklevoss-bitcoin-etf-100-million/
[https://perma.cc/DYW5-23M9]; Asjylyn Loder, Bitcoin ETFs Keep Trying, Despite
Regulators'Rejections, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2018, 10:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articl
eslbitcoin-etfs-keep-trying-despite-regulators-rejections- 1537754701 [https://perma.c/4SJ
F-U9WW]; Kate Rooney & Bob Pisani, Winklevoss Twins Bitcoin ETF Rejected by SEC,
CNBC (July 26, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/26/winklevoss-twins-
bitcoin-etf-rejected-by-sec.html [https://perma.cc/6HYU-W9UD]. Only "[a] half-century
ago, checks held an overwhelmingly dominant role in facilitating payments without cash."
Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public
Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493, 1494 (2016).
2. XBT-Cboe Bitcoin Futures, CBOE, http://cfe.cboe.com/cfe-products/xbt-cboe-
bitcoin-futures [https://perma.cc/G89G-7EZX] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
3. CME Bitcoin Futures Frequently Asked Questions, CME GROUP (Dec. 15, 2017),
http://www.cmegroup.com/education/cme-bitcoin-futures-frequently-asked-questions.html
[https://perma.cc/2GUV-6G7P].
4. Silvia Amaro & Arjun Kharpal, Nasdaq 'Investigating' Bitcoin Futures that Are
Different from Rivals, CEO Says, CNBC: THE SANCTUARY (Jan. 23, 2018, 7:23 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/23/nasdaq-looking-into-bitcoin-futures-different-to-rivals.
ceo.html [https://perma.cc/85LU-WZP3].
5. See, e.g., Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency,
4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 159 (2012) (reviewing the literature on whether Bitcoin can
be regulated as a commodity or security); Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook,
Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE
J. ON REG. 495 (2015) (proposing a model for regulating cryptocurrency transactions in
which intermediaries play a role); Christina Martin, The Rise of Cryptocurrency: What Is It
and How Should It Be Regulated?, U. BALT. L. REV. (Sept. 22, 2017),
https://ubaltlawreview.com/2017/09/22/the-rise-of-cryptocurrency-what-is-it-and.how-
should-it-be-regulated-by-christina-martini [https://perma.cc/CR6T-CC4R] (describing the
regulatory framework for cryptocurrency after describing it as a currency and technology
but not as a futures product); Christopher Burks, Comment, Bitcoin: Breaking Bad or
Breaking Barriers?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 244 (2017), http://ncjolt.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/Burks_- Final-copy.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NL8-AE4Y] (examining
the various bitcoin regulations).
2019 FUTURE OF BITCOIN FUTURES
about bitcoin futures given their newness and risk to the market.
Futures generally contribute to systemic risk,6 but distinctive
features of bitcoin futures heighten concerns. Indeed, the Futures
Industry Association (FIA)-a trade organization representing
major banks and brokers-has protested the introduction of
bitcoin futures to the market without much scrutiny, given their
potential to disrupt the economy. 7 This demonstrates a public gulf
between institutional traders and the clearinghouses that
facilitate trading and mitigate systemic risk.
Bitcoin futures are still relatively few in number, which keeps
their risk to the economy limited.8 Their growth, however, may
cause severe risk to the financial markets. 9
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
responded to the FIA's concerns with heightened review for
cryptocurrency futures. 10 Now, the question is how to minimize
the systemic risk caused by bitcoin futures. This Article explores
6. Griffith notes on systematic risk that:
Systemic risk refers to the linkages and interdependencies between
participants in the financial market, such that a significant loss initially touching
only a small number of participants can spread and threaten to engulf the entire
system, ultimately causing a contraction in the real economy. Systemic risk is an
appropriate target for regulatory attention because private actors lack adequate
incentives to control it.
Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market
in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1296 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
"Derivatives are all about risk. They are, at their core, nothing more than a contractual
means by which parties allocate the risk of a fluctuation in price of an underlying reference
asset." Id. at 1295.
7. Walt Lukken, CEO, FIN. INDUS. ASS'N, Open Letter to CFTC Chairman Giancarlo
Regarding the Listing of Cryptocurrency Derivatives, FIA (Dec. 7, 2017, 9:15 AM),
https://fia.org/articles/open-letter-cftc-chairman-giancarlo-regarding-listing-cryptocurrenc
y-derivatives [https:Hlperma.cc/QD29-4Z23].
8. Stan Higgins, Moody's: Bitcoin Volatility (Likely) Won't Hurt CME's Risk Rating,
COINDESK (Feb. 14, 2018, 5:50 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/moodys-bitcoin-volatility-
likely-wont-hurt-cmes-risk-rating/ [https:/Hperma.cc158C6-AD6D]. This is one of the
reasons that credit rating service Moody's does not believe that the launch of bitcoin futures
will hurt the creditworthiness of either CME or CBOE. Id.
9. Hilary J. Allen, $=C--BITCOIN?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877, 902, 919 (2017). 'If Bitcoin,
or any other virtual currency, were to become widely used (and to become truly
transformative, it would need to be widely used), it could pose a threat to financial stability
in a way that transactions consummated in United States dollars ('USD) do not." Id. at
879.
10. David Felsenthal et al., Clifford Chance Discusses the Role of the CFTC in the
Regulation of Bitcoin, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 16, 2018),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/218/02/16/clifford-chance-discusses-the-role-of-the-cft
c-in-the-regulation-of-bitcoin/#_- ftnref13 [httpsJ/perma.cc/E9CJ-YDDL]. 'The CFrC has
emerged as the primary federal regulator of virtual currency markets but its jurisdiction is
surprisingly limited, particularly with respect to spot markets. As the markets grow, and
if disruptions occur, the CFTC and other federal regulators may feel pressure to expand
their supervision of these markets." Id.
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the regulatory options for bitcoin futures to avoid undue risk.
Accordingly, Part II examines bitcoin, while Part III turns to
bitcoin futures. Part IV considers whether to regulate bitcoin
futures and explores potential regulatory options.
II. BITCOIN
Satoshi Nakamoto, a pseudonym for an unknown person or
group, designed bitcoin.11 Nakamoto introduced bitcoin in a 2008
white paper titled "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System. 1 2
At its essence, bitcoin is a cryptocurrency, which is a digital
currency.1 3 This is different from fiat money, which is declared to
be legal tender by a government but is not necessarily backed by a
physical commodity.1 4 While fiat money is issued by a country's
central bank, bitcoin is issued electronically by a computer
program that has a predetermined cap of twenty-one million
bitcoins.1 5
There are two ways to get bitcoin-either to buy it on an
exchange such as Coinbase1 6 or to earn it by processing bitcoin
transactions, called "mining."17  Owners store their bitcoin in a
11. Klint Finley, The WIRED Guide to Bitcoin, WIRED (Feb. 1, 2018, 9:26 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/guide-bitcoin/ [https://perma.ccICD45-SRHS]. Nakamoto's
identity is unknown, but it has been investigated by the National Security Agency (NSA)
in case bitcoin is a form of sabotage from a foreign country. Alexander Muse, How the NSA
Identified Satoshi Nakamoto, MEDIUM (Aug. 26, 2017), https://medium.com/cryptomuse/ho
w-the-nsa-caught-satoshi-nakamoto-868affcef595 [https://perma.cc/72C3-6R7X].
12. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 1 (Oct.
31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), https:/bitcoin.orgbitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc43VR-
CVZ4].
13. Id.
14. David Groshoff, Kickstarter My Heart: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the
Madness of Crowdfunding Constraints and Bitcoin Bubbles, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV.
489, 507-09 (2014).
15. Id. at 512.
16. Sean McLeod, Note, Bitcoin: The Utopia or Nightmare of Regulation, 9 ELON L.
REV. 553, 568 (2017) ("Coinbase was opened in January 2014 and allows for legal trading
of digital currencies. It was heralded as the first regulated Bitcoin exchange." (footnotes
omitted)). For ideas on how to regulate Coinbase and similar exchanges, see Jerry
Markham, Regulating the Moneychangers, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 789, 790 (2016).
17. As explained on a bitcoin website:
Bitcoin Mining is a peer-to-peer computer process used to secure and verify
bitcoin transactions-payments from one user to another on a decentralized
network. Mining involves adding bitcoin transaction data to Bitcoin's global
public ledger of past transactions. Each group of transactions is called a block.
Blocks are secured by Bitcoin miners and build on top of each other forming a
chain. This ledger of past transactions is called the blockchain. The blockchain
serves to confirm transactions to the rest of the network as having taken place.
Bitcoin nodes use the blockchain to distinguish legitimate Bitcoin transactions
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"digital wallet," which exists either in the cloud or on a user's
computer.18 Hackers have occasionally stolen bitcoin from such
digital wallets. 19
Bitcoin has occupied a unique role in society. Illegal
businesses and criminals have used bitcoin because of its
anonymity;20 although, this may have declined with the popularity
of bitcoin. 21 A few mainstream businesses have also accepted
bitcoin as an alternative payment, raising the trust level in its
functionality.22 Finally, some people are predisposed toward
bitcoin given its independence from government. 23
Bitcoin has several shortcomings as well. It is arguable
whether bitcoin comports with the basic functions required of a
from attempts to re-spend coins that have already been spent elsewhere.
Bitcoin Mining, BITCOIN.coM, https://www.bitcoin.comlbitcoin-mining [httpsJ/perma.ccM
AP7-83U8] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
18. Catherine Martin Christopher, Whack-A-Mole: Why Prosecuting Digital Currency
Exchanges Won't Stop Online Money Laundering, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 14 (2014);
How to Store Your Bitcoin, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.comlinformation/how-to-store-
your-bitcoins/ [https:Hlperma.cc/EG94-6SUU] (last updated Jan. 20, 2018); Noelle Acheson,
How to Store Your Bitcoin, COINDESK (last updated Jan. 20, 2018)
https://www.coindesk.com/information/how-to-store-your-bitcoins [https:Hlperma.ccIY9D6-
M3KVJ.
19. Christopher, supra note 18, at 21 (explaining how "[h]ackers can obtain a Bitcoin
user's private key and use it to transfer some or all of the bitcoins in the user's wallet to
another location" and noting examples of such hacking (citation omitted)).
20. Sean Foley et al., Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity is Financed
Through Cryptocurrencies?, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 34-35),
https://ssrn.comlabstract=3102645 [https:Hlperma.cc/QZ9B-U99F]. "[A]pproximately one-
quarter of bitcoin users and one-half of bitcoin transactions are associated with illegal
activity. Around $72 billion of illegal activity per year involves bitcoin, which is close to the
scale of the US and European markets for illegal drugs." Id. (manuscript at abstract).
21. Id. (manuscript at 2-3). Criminals' movement away from bitcoin is attributed to
two primary factors:
The first is an increase in mainstream and speculative interest in bitcoin. For
example, we find that the proportion of illegal activity in bitcoin is inversely
related to the Google search intensity for the keyword "bitcoin." ... The second
factor is the emergence of alternative cryptocurrencies that are more opaque and
better at concealing a user's activity (e.g., Dash, Monero, and ZCash).
Id. However, "[d]espite these two factors affecting the use of bitcoin in illegal activity, as
well as numerous darknet marketplace seizures by law enforcement agencies, the amount
of illegal activity involving bitcoin at the end of our sample in April 2017 remains close to
its all-time high." Id. (manuscript at 3).
22. Kevin V. Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual Currency Regulation in
the Bitcoin Age, 90 WASH. L. REV. 271, 273 (2015). "At its peak in March of 2014, the daily
volume of Bitcoin transactions in United States dollars exceeded $575,000,000. The
growing mainstream acceptance of Bitcoin, however, is best illustrated by the growing
number of leading merchants that have decided to accept Bitcoin payments." Id. at 271.
23. "Nakamoto's writings acknowledge the attractiveness of Bitcoin to libertarians,
but they do not specifically support any view of his own politics." Shawn Bayern, Of
Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 Nw. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 257, 260 n.13 (2014).
544 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 56:3
currency: stored value and fungibility.24  Bitcoin is neither
intrinsically valuable, like gold, nor is it rooted in a commodity. 25
There might be some value resulting from its scarcity, but it is an
artificial scarcity. 26 Nobel-winning economist Paul Krugman has
suggested that, unlike gold or fiat currencies, bitcoin derives its
value solely from a self-fulfilling expectation that others will
accept it as payment. 27
Bitcoin as a currency is not regulated like other currencies,
which increases the risk of price manipulation. 2  Bad actors can
manipulate the price of cryptocurrencies and then cash out before
other investors discover the scheme. 29 There are also concerns
about a bitcoin bubble. 30 Additionally, without a central bank
underlying cryptocurrencies, the trustworthiness of bitcoin has
been questioned. 31 These factors contribute to the volatility of
24. See generally Allen, supra note 9, at 889 (noting that "important attributes of
money are its ability to function as a store of value (meaning that it 'can be saved and
retrieved in the future'), and that it is widely accepted as a means of exchange" (footnotes
omitted)). See also Adam Chodorow, Bitcoin and the Definition of Foreign Currency, 19
FLA. TAX REV. 365, 373 (2016) ("Bitcoin poses a problem for the tax system because it is
designed to function as a currency, but it does not fit within the traditional understanding
of foreign currency."); Ralph E. McKinney, Jr. et al., The Evolution of Financial Instruments
and the Legal Protection Against Counterfeiting: A Look at Coin, Paper, and Virtual
Currencies, 2015 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 273 (reviewing the characteristics of currencies
in the context of bitcoin).
25. Nicholas A. Plassaras, Comment, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin
Within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 377, 390-91 (2013).
26. Only 21 million bitcoins can be mined per bitcoin's protocol as set by Satoshi
Nakamoto. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
27. Gola Yashu, Paul Krugman Takes Another Potshot at Bitcoin, NEWS BTC (July
16, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.newsbtc.com/2015/07/16/paul-krugman-takes-another-
potshot-at-bitcoin/ [https:/perma.cc/EL9E-WJWX].
28. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-The
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 283, 311 (1991) (describing commodity
manipulation and the difficulties of prosecuting it).
29. Matt Robinson & Tom Schoenberg, U.S. Launches Criminal Probe into Bitcoin
Price Manipulation, BLOOMBERG (May 24, 2018, 3:41 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-24/bitcoin-manipulation-is-said-to-be-
focus-of-u-s-criminal-probe [https://perma.cc6M6H-7RKN].
30. CFTC Chairman Giancarlo stated:
Others, however, argue that this is all hype or technological alchemy and
that the current interest in virtual currencies is overblown and resembles wishful
thinking, a fever, even a mania. They have declared the 2017 heightened
valuation of Bitcoin to be a bubble similar to the famous 'Tulip Bubble" of the
seventeenth century.
Press Release, Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n, Written Testimony of Chairman J.
Christopher Giancarlo Before the U.S. Senate Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry
Comm. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagiancarlo
38 [https://perma.cc/HN8A-RAVS].
31. See, e.g., Jeff Kearns, Greenspan Says Bitcoin a Bubble Without Intrinsic
Currency Value, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2013, 4:37 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ar
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bitcoin's price. 32
In addition to the lack of consumer protection, there is the
possibility that bitcoin could be used to launder money and finance
terrorism. 33 As a result, anti-money-laundering laws have been
applied to bitcoin. 34 A common tool used to prosecute bitcoin
business operators is 18 U.S.C. § 1960, which prohibits operation
of an "unlicensed money transmitting business."35  In United
States v. Faiella, for example, the defendant was charged with
selling over $1 million of bitcoin for illegal use on the illicit online
marketplace, Silk Road. 36 The Treasury Department has also
applied a regulatory scheme to bitcoin as a currency. 37
In addition to being a currency, bitcoin relies on a new
technology. To implement bitcoin, Nakamoto devised the first
blockchain to solve the double-spending problem for digital
currency so that people cannot spend the same money twice. 38 "At
its root, a blockchain is a... public ledger that everyone can
inspect, but which no single user controls. The participants in a
given blockchain system work together to keep the ledger updated;
ticles/2013-12-04/greenspan-says-bitcoin-a-bubble-without-intrinsic-currency-value [https:
//perma.cc/KN93-6WQW]. But see Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model:
Exploring the Roles of Trust and Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17
NEV. L.J. 139, 172-75 (2016). "Bitcoin has long been touted as a currency and a payment
system that relies on cryptography and mathematics rather than trust." Id. at 139.
32. "In 2013, the market price of a bitcoin fluctuated between $13 and $1200 USD."
Matthew Kien-Meng Ly, Note, Coining Bitcoin's 'Legal-Bits" Examining the Regulatory
Framework for Bitcoin and Virtual Currencies, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 587, 590-91 (2014)
(citation omitted).
33. 'The two most important issues that concern governments about Bitcoin are (1)
the lack of consumer protection, and (2) the possibility that bitcoins could be used to launder
money and finance terrorism." Ian A. Holcomb, Bitcoin's Standing Within the Global
Regulatory and Economic Marketplace, 23 CURRENTS, no. 1, 2016, at 56, 62-63.
34. United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("If there
were any ambiguity in this regard-and the Court finds none-the legislative history
supports application of Section 1960 in this instance. Section 1960 was passed as an anti-
money laundering statute, designed 'to prevent the movement of funds in connection with
drug dealing."' (citations omitted)).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2012).
36. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 545; see also Lawrence Trautman, Virtual Currencies;
Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve, Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH.,
no. 4, 2014, at 1, 97-98.
37. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF'T NETWORK, FIN-2013-GO01,
GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF FINCEN'S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013), https://www.fincen.gov/resources/st
atutes-regulations/guidance/application-fincens-regulations-persons-administering [https:
//perma.cc/Q36E-GJ49].
38. Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-By-Block: Leveraging the Power of
Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote Cyber Peace, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH.,
no. 1, 2017, at 334, 342.
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it may be amended only by strict rules and consensus. ' 39 These
ledger updates are made by people on the internet with
appropriate software who solve cryptography puzzles for payment
in bitcoin.40 "Using algorithms, the system can verify if a
transaction will be approved and added to the blockchain and once
it is on the blockchain it is extremely difficult to change or remove
that transaction."41
While bitcoin relies on blockchain technology to validate
transactions, the technology can be used in other mainstream
contexts to also record transactions. The banking sector is among
the leading industries with blockchain patents. 42 The blockchain
technology underlying bitcoin can also be used to record property
deeds and contracts, 43 but it operates with significant resource
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. S.H. Spencer Compton & Diane Schottenstein, Questions and Answers About
Using Blockchain Technology in Real Estate Practice, 33 PRAC. REAL EST. L., no. 5, 2017, at
5, 5-6.
41. Id. at 5.
In a blockchain, there is no third-party intermediary verifying the veracity
of the transaction, rather it is verified by "nodes." A "node" is a transaction
between computers. Each node contains the history of a transaction down to the
"genesis block" or beginning block. Once a command is made to execute a
transaction, the node will trace through the history of the blockchain all the way
to the genesis block to confirm that the new transacting party is "cleared" to join
the block. The new block can then be added to the chain, which creates an
indelible and transparent record of transactions.
In theory, blockchain is tamper-proof because it is decentralized and not
controlled by one party. All the nodes maintaining the same database will be
involved in verifying the transaction which is a check on the veracity of the
system.
Id. at 6.
42. Lee stated when examining blockchain patents that:
We identified 1,045 US patents and published, pending applications
specifically related to blockchain and distributed ledger technologies. Please note
that our analysis does not include general cryptographic or encryption-related
patents, such as for security and authorization, which do not involve a distributed
ledger or decentralized concurrency methods.
Based on our analysis, the major patent holders in this space are Bank of
America, IBM, Mastercard, FMR LLC, World Award Foundation, TD Bank,
Coinbase, 402 Technologies, Accenture, and Dell. The list includes entities from
the financial services, traditional technology, patent holding and consulting
industries.
Alex Lee, Blockchain Patent Filings Dominated by Financial Services Industry, PATENTVUE
(Jan. 12, 2018, 2:09 PM), http://patentvue.com/2018/0112/blockchain-patent-flings-
dominated-by-financial-services-industry/ [https://perma.cc/SMC3-WYKJ].
43. Shackelford & Myers, supra note 38, at 336 ("From making businesses more
efficient to recording property deeds to engendering the growth of 'smart' contracts...
blockchain technology is now being investigated by a huge range of organizations and is
attracting billions in venture funding.").
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demands .44
In sum, because of its utilization of blockchain, bitcoin has
developed both as a currency and as a forerunner of a new
technology over the last decade. Bitcoin futures emerged most
recently, raising a new set of issues.
III. BITCOIN FUTURES
Futures are contracts to buy or sell a specific quantity of an
asset at a specified price and date in the future.45 In other words,
futures are simply contracts for the future delivery of the
underlying asset at a certain price-they permit producers and
consumers of a commodity to insure themselves against price
movements. 46 However, delivery is not always sought, and the
futures contract can be settled with money instead, serving as an
investment and hedging vehicle in itself.47 Futures are therefore
derivatives, with their value deriving from the underlying asset,
and they trade on exchanges. 48
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
exercises exclusive jurisdiction and regulatory authority over
44. See Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment
Systems: What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041, 1061-62 (2017) (describing the vast
computational distribution effort that powers the bitcoin transaction verification system).
Trautman and Harrell note that:
By way of comparison, with a hash rate of less than one percent the current rate,
Kroll, Davey, and Felten stated that taken as a whole, the Bitcoin transaction
verification network is more powerful than the combined computing power of the
top 500 supercomputers in the world, giving pause to anyone concerned about
whether the costs of transaction verification in Bitcoin are acceptable.
Id. at 1062 (citing Joshua A. Kroll et al., The Economics of Bitcoin Mining or Bitcoin in the
Presence of Adversaries 8 (June 11-12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis20l3/papers/KrollDaveyFeltenWEIS2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VES8-3JLF].
45. Dean Zimmerli, Something Old, Something New: Relying on the Traditional
Agricultural Cooperative to Help Farmers Solve the Power Imbalance in Modern Meatpacker
Production Contracts, 24 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 59, 71 (2015).
46. FED. RESERVE BD., BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL sec. 2130.0
(Sept. 2017), 2017 WL 6373175 (providing an overview of futures, forward, and option
contracts).
47. Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution,
Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX REV. 1, 64-65 (1993) ("While the buyer and
seller may discharge their contractual obligations under the futures contract by accepting
delivery and delivering respectively an approved grade of commodity as the terms of the
contract require, delivery of the physical commodity rarely occurs.").
48. Zachary T. Knepper, Examining the Merits of Dual Regulation for Single-Stock
Futures: How the Divergent Insider Trading Regimes for Federal Futures and Securities
Markets Demonstrate the Necessity for (and Virtual Inevitability of) Dual CFTC-SEC
Regulation for Single-Stock Futures, 3 PIERCE L. REV. 33, 34 (2004).
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futures contracts under the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA).49
The CFTC seeks to ensure financially sound markets and works to
avoid systemic risk "from fraud, manipulation, and abusive
practices related to derivatives ...."50
While the Dodd-Frank Act did not contemplate bitcoin
futures, 51 it did consider systemic risk to the financial system. 52
49. Knepper writes:
In the 1970s, this was a point of contention between the CFTC and the Securities
Exchange Commission, which is responsible for regulating the securities markets.
Conflict over the regulation of securities futures came to a head in 1982 in Board
of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, wherein the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that securities futures regulation was properly the province
of the CFTC by the terms of the Commodities Exchange Act. In response to this
ruling and to settle jurisdictional questions over securities futures, the SEC and
the CFTC approached Congress with a proposed regulatory agreement known as
the Shad-Johnson Accord, which was enacted into law in 1982. Shad-Johnson
trifurcated securities futures and options regulation: the SEC would regulate
securities-based options, the CFTC would regulate futures of broad-based stock
indexes and government securities, and futures on single stocks and narrow-based
stock indexes would be prohibited. This prohibition on single-stock futures and
narrow-based stock index futures was intended to be temporary.
Id. at 34-35 (footnotes omitted).
50. Mission & Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,
http://www.cftc.gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm [https://perma.cc/EK27-KTT
R] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
51. Tarbert writes about the Dodd-Frank Act:
[O]n July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law a package of financial
regulatory reforms unparalleled in scope and depth since the New Deal: The Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Act or Dodd-Frank Act)
was a sweeping reaction to perceived regulatory failings revealed by the most
severe financial crisis since the Great Depression. The Dodd-Frank Act was
intended to restructure the regulatory framework for the United States financial
system, with broad and deep implications for the financial services industry where
the crisis started.
Heath P. Tarbert, The Dodd-Frank Act-Two Years Later, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
373, 373 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
52. Ordower writes:
Each commodity exchange in the United States has an associated
clearinghouse. The clearinghouse insures the integrity of trades by becoming
substituted for each buyer and seller following confirmation of a trade, so that
each party to a trade looks only to the clearinghouse for performance. In order to
protect its central position, the clearinghouse requires margin deposits and
continuously marks positions to market to provide some assurance that its
members will be able to fulfill their contractual obligations. In addition, the
clearinghouse generally establishes a security or guarantee fund which is
intended to permit the clearinghouse to meet its obligations as the substituted
counterparty to contracts initiated by an insolvent clearing member despite the
failure of the insolvent clearing member to honor its contracts. Further, the
clearinghouse imposes net limits on the number of positions that a member
(representing a customer or itself) may hold overnight and establishes financial
minimums that clearing members must maintain.
Ordower, supra note 47, at 69 (footnotes omitted).
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The legislation therefore calls on clearinghouses-or central
counterparties-to reduce systemic risk that caused the 2008
financial crisis. 53 As a result, many trades must go through a
clearinghouse, which spreads the risk of default among clearing
members by mutualizing risk.54  In other words, "[t]he
fundamental purpose of the clearinghouse is to amass risk in
hopes of containing it." 55 The clearinghouses and their members
have their own regulations, 56  but "[t]he fundamentals of
clearinghouse risk-management procedures consist of the
following: (1) strict membership criteria, (2) robust margining, and
(3) a predetermined default management process." 57
Despite their function to reduce risk, some clearinghouses are
now allowing bitcoin futures trading, undeterred by the inherent
risks. Perhaps this is not surprising given that clearinghouses are
for-profit institutions with an incentive to introduce new products
53. See Julia Lees Allen, Note, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systematic Risk: A
Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1091-92 (2012); see also
Griffith, supra note 6, at 1292, 1317-18 ('The conventional wisdom is that the global
financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed faults in the ability of international financial
regulation to contain the problem of systemic risk. Further conventional wisdom suggests
that the failure to regulate complex financial instruments, especially derivatives,
contributed significantly to the crisis." (footnotes omitted)); Lucy McKinstry, Note,
Regulating a Global Market: The Extraterritorial Challenge of Dodd-Frank's Margin
Requirements for Uncleared OTC Derivatives & A Mutual Recognition Solution, 51 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 776, 794-96 (2013).
54. Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment
Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 812 (2010) ("Clearinghouses and guarantee funds, much
like insurance companies, mutualize the risk of localized defaults among all members or
contributors.').
Financial institutions regularly trade risky investments. If one major trading
institution fails to make good on its obligations to another, the first's failure could
be contagious, spreading outward through the interconnected financial system,
inducing interconnected financial institutions to collapse one after another, like a
row of dominoes, unless regulators can prop up one of the early dominoes before
contagion knocks down the entire row. One strategically-placed financial
institution's failure puts the entire financial system at risk of malfunctioning,
rendering it unable to channel funds through the economy. As a result, economic
activity weakens.
Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1643-44 (2013). For
example, "[d]uring its lifetime, [LCH.Clearnet, Ltd., a clearinghouse that specializes in
interest rate swaps,] has handled five defaults, with [a $9 trillion default of Lehman
Brothers Special Financing, Inc.] constituting the largest default." Allen, supra note 53, at
1091 n.50.
55. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1350.
56. See Allen, supra note 53, at 1085-87 (describing how a clearinghouse functions);
but see Dombalagian, supra note 54, at 779 ("I question whether any regulatory agency or
collection of agencies can possess the authority, independence, and incentive to combat the
inherent procyclicality of the systemic risk inherent in the financial services industry."
(footnote omitted)).
57. Allen, supra note 53, at 1087 (footnotes omitted).
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to trade.58 Some commentators suggest that clearinghouses are
the new "too big to fail" institutions. 5
9
A new futures contract can be listed by an exchange either
after: "1) the exchange submits a written self-certification to the
CFTC that the contract complies with CEA and CFTC regulations,
or 2) the exchange voluntarily submits the contract for CFTC
approval."60 Self-certification is a process in which the exchange
verifies that a new contract complies with CEA requirements. 61 If
the CFTC does not object to the findings of the self-certification,
the exchange may list the new product one to two days after
submitting the self-certification. 62
58. Kristin N. Johnson, Commentary on the Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture:
Clearinghouse Governance: Moving Beyond Cosmetic Reform, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 681, 701
(2012) ("Influenced by conflicts and self-interested incentives, clearinghouse members'
decisions may ironically engender-rather than reduce-risk."); see also Allen, supra note
53, at 1091 n.51 ("Analysts at Barclays Capital recently expressed concern as to whether
clearinghouses will maintain the strict collateral requirements necessary to prevent
systemic risk given that they are for-profit enterprises.").
59. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial
Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 587 (2011) ("[A] clearinghouse ups the ante on 'too
big to fail,' because the clearinghouse will itself be too big to fail. That's fine, but only if it
doesn't fail.').
While a clearinghouse can be useful in important dimensions, it is unlikely
to be anywhere near as helpful as the consensus in Washington came to believe
during the reform discussions. Deep weaknesses afflict the clearinghouse, making
it unwise to rely on it primarily, as Dodd-Frank has. First, it's unclear whether
the exchange would itself be properly incentivized to handle counterparty risk,
particularly if the major derivatives dealers themselves control the clearinghouse.
Id. at 586-87; see also Griffith, supra note 6, at 1350 ("Even the rumor of a clearinghouse
failure, Ben Bernanke has warned, could be a source of contagion [throughout the
economy]."). However, "[f]inancial clearinghouses have failed in France (the Caisse de
Liquidation, in 1974), Kuala Lumpur (the Commodity Clearing House, in 1983), and in
Hong Kong (the Futures Guarantee Corporation, in 1987)." Id. at 1350 n.285 (citing Bob
Hills et al., Central Counterparty Clearing Houses and Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY
REV., June 1999, at 122, 129). 'The Chicago Mercantile Exchange survived failure in 1987
thanks to a last minute government bailout of its constituent members." Id. (citation
omitted).
60. Lee Reiners, Bitcoin Futures Are a Bad Idea, FINREG BLOG (Dec. 13, 2017),
https://sites.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2017/12/13/bitcoin-futures-are-a-bad-idea [https://per
ma.cc/32XX-EEM2].
61. Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 109 (2012).
Among other things, the CFMA repealed section 5a(a)(12) of the CEA and
eliminated the requirement of prior approval by the CFTC of exchanges' rules and
products. The new law allowed regulated exchanges to list futures contracts upon
a written self-certification that such products complied with the requirements of
the CEA, as amended.
Id.
62. CFTC Backgrounder on Oversight of and Approach to Virtual Currency Futures
Markets, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N 2-3 (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/iles/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/filelbackgr
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Self-certification was used to approve new cryptocurrency
derivatives products.63 The CME and the CBOE also voluntarily
provided information regarding their bitcoin futures contracts
months before filing their self-certifications. 64 Specifically,
[CFTC] staff held rigorous discussions with CME over
the course of six weeks, CFE over the course of four months,
and had numerous calls with [the Cantor Exchange]. CME,
CFE and Cantor agreed to significant enhancements to
contract design and settlement, and CME to margining, at
the request of Commission staff, as well as more information
sharing with the underlying cash bitcoin exchanges to assist
CME, CFE, Cantor and the CFTC in surveillance. 65
Despite the questionability of self-certification of bitcoin
futures, the CFTC has not ultimately condemned the practice. 66
Self-certification requires the exchange to prove that the new
contract is not readily susceptible to manipulation, but this is one
of the main concerns regarding bitcoin.67
After self-certifying, CBOE launched trading in bitcoin
futures on December 10, 2017, while CME Group did so a week
oundervirtualcurrency0l.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PX6-Y2FP] [hereinafter CFTC Backgrou
nder]; see also Reiners, supra note 60; Listing Products for Trading by Certification, 17
C.F.R. § 40.2 (2018).
63. CFTC Backgrounder, supra note 62, at 2; see also Christopher Bowen, CHI.
MERCANTILE EXCHANGE INC., CFTC Regulation 40.2(a) Certification, Notification
Regarding the Initial Listing ofthe Bitcoin Futures Contract, CME Submission No. 17-417S
(Dec. 1, 2017), http://www.cmegroup.comlmarket-regulationrule-filings/2017/12/17-
417S.pdf [https://perma.cc/78DF-8XQR]; Cboe Futures Exchange, LLC Product Certification




64. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Statement on
Self-Certification of Bitcoin Products by CME, CFE and Cantor Exchange (Dec. 1, 2017),
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7654-17 [https://perma.cc/TX7G-ARFX].
65. Id.
66. CFTC Backgrounder, supra note 62, at 2. ('The product self-certification process
was deliberately designed by Congress and prior Commissions to give initiative to
[designated contract markets] to certify new products. This is consistent with a [designated
contract market's] role as a self-regulatory organization (SRO) and the CFTC's principles-
based approach to regulation.").
67. Reiners notes about bitcoin manipulation:
Because the price of Bitcoin futures are [sic] based on the price of Bitcoin, a
manipulator could place a large trade in the Bitcoin spot market in order to have
the price of the futures contract move in her favor. This is referred to as banging-
the-settlement, and it typically only occurs when the futures contract is cash
settled, which Bitcoin futures are. The potential for manipulation has focused
attention on CBOE's and CME's choice of Bitcoin reference rate. If the reference
rate can be easily manipulated, so too can the price of the futures contract.
Reiners, supra note 60.
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later.68 Other exchanges are also considering offering bitcoin
futures.69 Bitcoin futures are settled in dollars, not in bitcoin,
which trades at different dollar prices in different places.70 CBOE
settlements, for example, are based on bitcoin's value on the
Gemini Exchange. 71
A few days after CME Group and CBOE announced that they
would launch bitcoin futures contracts, Walt Lukken, CEO and
President of the FIA, wrote that FIA and its members were
worried about having to pay for outstanding contracts caused by
bitcoin's price changes. 72 "As the principal members of derivatives
clearinghouses worldwide, FIA's 64 clearing members play a
critical role in the reduction of systemic risk by guaranteeing their
customers' trades, contributing to the guarantee funds of
clearinghouses and committing to assessment obligations during
clearinghouse shortfalls."73
The FIA said a public discussion should have occurred before
allowing either CME Group or the CBOE to complete self-
certification procedures because bitcoin is a non-standard
product:74
[We believe that the launch of new exchange-traded
derivatives in cryptocurrencies deserves a healthy dialogue
between regulators, exchanges, clearinghouses and the
clearing firms who will be absorbing the risk of these volatile,
emerging instruments during a default. Unfortunately, the
launching of these innovative products through the 1-day
self-certification process did not allow for proper public
transparency and input. Under law, exchanges may self-
certify a product for trading by the close of business one day
and then list the product for trading the next day. This
process does not require CFTC approval or input and allows
little or no time for public review. While suited for
standardized products, this process does not distinguish for
a product's risk profile or unique nature. We believe that
this expedited self-certification process for these novel
68. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
69. Amaro & Kharpal, supra note 4; Marie Huillet, Confirmed: Nasdaq's Bitcoin
Futures Will Launch in 'First Half of 2019, COINTELEGRAPH (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.comlnews/confirmed-nasdaqs-bitcoin-futures-will-launch-in-first-half
-of-2019 [https://perma.cc/D925-JJZW].
70. Bitcoin Futures Contract Specs, CME GROUP, https://www.cmegroup.com/tradin
g/equity-index/us-indexbitcoincontract_specifications.html [https://perma.cc/Z6CW-64X
X] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
71. XBT-Cboe Bitcoin Futures, supra note 2.
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products does not align with the potential risks that underlie
their trading and should be reviewed.
75
FIA concluded that it "remain[ed] apprehensive with the lack
of transparency and regulation of the underlying reference
products on which these futures contracts are based and whether
exchanges have the proper oversight to ensure the reference
products are not susceptible to manipulation, fraud, and
operational risk."76
The FIA suggests that speculation in bitcoin futures is
unique.7 7 Indeed, bitcoin experiences relatively wild price
volatility78  and frequent hacks.7 9 Bitcoin futures are also
comparatively easier to manipulate.8 0 Thus, bitcoin futures are
riskier than other futures, with losses only multiplied.
81
Following the FIA's protest, the CFTC stated that it gave
bitcoin futures heightened review and that all future applications
by derivatives exchanges to list virtual currency derivatives will
receive the same treatment.8 2 The CFTC's heightened review
means that the agency will request voluntary compliance by
applicant derivatives exchanges with several criteria, including
"substantially high" initial and maintenance margins, information
sharing agreements, and product launches coordinated with the
CFTC's market surveillance branch to enable the CFTC to monitor
"minute-by-minute developments. '"83
The CFTC thus developed a "heightened review" process for
cryptocurrency futures that includes monitoring the markets for




78. See Market Price (USD), BLOCKCHAIN.INFO, https://www.blockchain.com/charts
/market-price? [https://perma.cc/VV98-WFMV] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019) (providing
historical and real-time price data).
79. "A massive hacker attack on Mt. Gox in June 2011 resulted in the theft of 25,000
bitcoins, valued at the time at approximately $8.75 million, and drove the exchange value
of a bitcoin from $17.50 to a single penny." Christopher, supra note 18, at 21.
80. See supra note 67.
81. See infra Part IV.
82. CFTC Backgrounder, supra note 62, at 2-3.
83. Id. at 3.
84. The CFTC provided:
At the heart of the CFTC's heightened review is extensive visibility and
monitoring of markets for virtual currency derivatives and underlying settlement
reference rates. Virtual currency self-certification under heightened review
means that the CFTC not only has clear legal authority, but now also will have
the means to police certain underlying spot markets for fraud and manipulation.
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regulatory options, considered next.
IV. REGULATING BITCOIN FUTURES
The entry of bitcoin futures into the market opens it to
regulation in a way that bitcoin as a currency and the blockchain
technology did not. There are several factors to consider regarding
the regulation of bitcoin futures.
A. Whether to Regulate
In the bitcoin context, the threshold question is whether to
regulate. There may be several drawbacks inherent to regulation.
For example, critics have raised concerns about bias in the
enforcement of regulatory schemes.8 5 Furthermore, there are
separate critiques regarding over-regulation of the business
environment.8 6
On the other hand, regulation would legitimize bitcoin to a
certain extent, which is important given bitcoin's background as
an anonymous cryptocurrency for criminals.8 7 Historically, the
legitimizing effect of regulation has brought some value.88
Regulation of bitcoin futures may also be particularly helpful
due to their unique characteristics. Futures markets multiply
losses and rewards by allowing leveraging,8 9 which differs from
85. Joan Macleod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About Equal
Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 263 (2003).
86. See, e.g., Karen Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC's New Role as
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1324 (2012) (noting
that Dodd-Frank even extends to regulating conflict minerals for moral and political
reasons). For the argument that tax incentives might be better solutions to certain
corporate issues than regulation, see Margaret Ryznar & Karen Woody, A Framework on
Mandating Versus Incentivizing Corporate Social Responsibility, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1667,
1681 (2015).
87. See Foley et al., supra note 20, at 2 ("[A]pproximately one-quarter of all users
(25%) and close to one-half of bitcoin transactions (44%) are associated with illegal
activity.'). Around $72 billion of illegal activity per year involves bitcoin, which is close to
the scale of the US market for illegal drugs. Id.
88. John C. Coffee Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and
Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1757, 1814-16 (2002) (suggesting that issuers are willing to migrate to U.S. exchanges
because even if they voluntarily subject themselves to the United States' higher disclosure
standards and greater threat of enforcement (both by public and private enforcers), they
partially compensate for weak protection of minority investors under their own
jurisdictions' laws and thereby achieve a higher market valuation).
89. Ordower writes:
The commodities industry involves products far less familiar to the investing
public than those available in the securities markets. Rather than the mundane,
stable world dominated by blue chip stocks and bonds, this exotic realm of futures,
forwards and options suggests risk, volatility and the potential for vast rewards
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stocks. 9° This risk is multiplied further by bitcoin's volatility.91
Moreover, the rapid growth and anonymity of bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies present challenges. 92 There are several
possible approaches, each with advantages and disadvantages, but
the main factor focuses on risk management. 93 A default on a
bitcoin futures contract poses a major risk to clearinghouses that
clear these contracts. 94 This is especially a concern following the
financial crisis in 2008 when clearinghouses became responsible
for managing the risks created in trading.
95
The importance of clearinghouses to economic stability was
clear even earlier, when the stock market fell over 500 points and
resulted in a credit crisis that almost destroyed the major U.S.
clearinghouses in 1987 on Black Monday.
96
More than a dozen clearing members of the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange ("CME") fell out of compliance with
capital requirements, and half a dozen more faced margin
calls that exceeded their capital. The largest clearing
member of the Options Clearing Corporation ("OCC"), First
Options of Chicago, appeared unlikely to satisfy margin
calls, potentially threatening all of the traders on the OCC-
affiliated Chicago Board Options Exchange ("CBOE"). Both
CME and CBOE temporarily halted trading, lest the
and devastating losses.... Regulatory distinctions, margin restrictions, and the
nature of the underlying products all contribute to these differences [between
commodities such as futures and securities markets involving stock].
Ordower, supra note 47, at 62.
90. Background of Federal Regulation of Futures Trading, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
104, 2015 WL 6854612 (2018).
91. See supra Part II.
92. See Foley et al., supra note 20, at 1, 6, 30-31.
93. But see Wulf A- Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflections on an Evolving
Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and the United
States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1438 (2010) ("[The concepts of .... whether there is
any such thing as excessive risk, and if so, how excessive risk is to be defined, is another
issue. Viewpoints on these questions will have a substantial impact on how a policy
maker-or a group of policy makers in a particular country-approaches regulation of risk
in the banking sector.').
94. 'In providing a means for this transfer of risk, however, derivatives create a
second risk-the risk of default on the contract. This second risk---counterparty credit
risk-is inherent in derivatives transactions, and is the basic way in which derivatives
contribute to systemic risk." Griffith, supra note 6, at 1295-96 (footnote omitted).
95. James E. Kelly, Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 ALB. L. REV. 421,
423-24 (2010) (noting that following the 2008 financial crisis, attention has focused on the
role of systemic risk in financial institutions and markets). See also supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
96. Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why
Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 49, 49-50 (2011); see also supra note 59.
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financial condition of the markets-and their
clearinghouses-deteriorate further.97
To avert a further crisis, the Federal Reserve provided liquidity to
commercial banks so that they would loan to CME clearing
members and even "lent directly to the parent company of First
Options, enabling the OCC to continue operations." 98 Hong Kong
did not take the same precautions to protect its main
clearinghouse, whose guarantee fund then collapsed and caused
deeper crisis in the region. 99
Thus, bitcoin futures cannot risk bankrupting or financially
weakening clearinghouses because they must manage risk for
significant parts of the financial sector: 'The two main
mechanisms through which a derivatives clearinghouse could
become insolvent would be (1) insufficient collateral and capital
requirements or ineffective default management procedures, and
(2) multiple-member defaults."100
Accordingly, it is essential that clearinghouses effectively
manage the risks caused by bitcoin futures. There are several
ways to do so that are considered next.
B. How to Regulate
There are numerous safeguards already implemented for
protecting the clearinghouses and the greater financial markets.
However, because of the uniqueness of bitcoin futures, some
additional measures might be introduced to manage risk.101
1. Prohibition. Some banks and governments have outright
banned bitcoin futures. For example, Merrill Lynch blocked
clients and financial advisers who trade on their behalf from
97. Kress, supra note 96, at 50 (footnotes omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Allen, supra note 53, at 1092. 'The first problem arises from the potential for
regulators to create clearinghouse rules that include insufficient minimum collateral or
capital requirements for derivatives clearinghouses, or that do not effectively regulate the
default management procedures." Id.
101. Griffith notes:
The best approach to systemic risk, however, may be one that understands
and anticipates that regulators and policymakers are not infallible and are likely
to make mistakes in the future, as indeed they have done in the past. In this
environment, a diversity of regulatory approaches to the same underlying problem
may provide greater protection against contagion and an outbreak of systemic
risk ....
Griffith, supra note 6, at 1372-73.
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buying bitcoin products. 10 2 South Korea has not enabled the
trading of bitcoin futures, 10 3 and neither has the Japanese
regulator.10 4
The CFTC can ban bitcoin futures as well, but a general rule
prohibiting trading in bitcoin futures can also be considered after
other regulatory methods have failed.10 5 If the concern regarding
bitcoin futures is risk, there are other ways to address it.
2. Position Limits. One risk management option is to put a
limit on the number of positions that may be held by any person.
Position limits serve "(i) to diminish excessive speculation ... ; (ii)
to deter and prevent market manipulation, squeezes, and corners;
(iii) to ensure sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and
(iv) to ensure that the price discovery function of the underlying
market is not disrupted."1°6
Title VII, Section 737 of Dodd-Frank allowed the CFTC to
establish position limits for certain commodity-based derivatives,
such as futures.10 7 The clearinghouse and clearing members can
also set position limits. For example, CME designed its contract
with professional traders in mind, and each contract is equal to
five bitcoin, compared to CBOE's contracts that are only one
bitcoin in size.108 These sorts of limits curtail the amount of risk
102. Elizabeth Dilts et al., Merrill Lynch Bans Clients from Investing in Silbert Bitcoin
Fund, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2018, 6:55 PM), https://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-bank-of-
america-merri l-lynch-bitcoin/merrill-lynch-bans-clients-from-investing-in-silbert-bitcoin-
fund-idUSKBN1ET02N [https://perma.cc/S5GU-GUXX]. The ban applied to all accounts
and precludes the firm's roughly 17,000 advisers from trying to sell bitcoin-related
investments. Id.
103. Evelyn Cheng & Cheang Ming, Bitcoin Briefly Falls 11% After South Korea Moves
to Ban New Cryptocurrency Trading Accounts, CNBC (Dec. 28, 2017, 2:47 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/28/bitcoin-drops- 1 -percent-as-south-korea-moves-to-regul
ate-cryptocurrency-trading.html [https://perma.cc/8R5N-A4YGI.
104. Gareth Allan & Yuki Hagiwara, Bitcoin Futures Get Cold Shoulder from Japanese
Regulator, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.comlnews/articles/2018-01-
24lbitcoin-futures-get-cold-shoulder-from-japan-financial-regulator [https://perma.cc/WU6
H-UF64].
105. Excessive regulation or an outright ban of bitcoin would not serve an overarching
goal of continual technological innovation. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K Rai, Fixing
Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 1, 8 (2008).
106. 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(3)(B)(i)-(iv) (2012).
107. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
§ 737(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1376, 1723 (2010) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(2)(A))
("[T]he commission shall by rule ... establish limits on the amount of positions, as
appropriate, other than bona fide hedge positions, that may be held by any person with
respect to contracts of sale for future delivery or with respect to options on the contracts or
commodities traded ... ").
108. Gregory Meyer, Bitcoin Futures Will Be a 'Slow Grower' and That's Okay, Says
CME Chief, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/44893dle-0763-1le8-
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each trader can carry when it comes to bitcoin futures.
3. Margins. Futures are highly leveraged because traders
can put down a deposit that is a low percentage of the total value
of the assets being traded, which magnifies gains or losses. 10 9 The
deposit-also known as the initial margin-is set for each type of
futures contract by the exchange or clearinghouse. 110
To control the risk of default, clearinghouses maintain a
margining regime that includes not only initial margin but also
variation margin. Both are collateral generally consisting of cash
or securities posted by a clearing member to protect the
clearinghouse in case of default.111 Initial margin covers the
estimate of potential future losses in managing a default in normal
market conditions.1 12 "The variation margin is the daily debit and
credit of profit and loss on the existing trades," keeping the
clearinghouse's risk current and preventing it from
accumulating.1 1 3
Bitcoin's volatility led CME to require traders to post margin
deposits of more than forty percent on their bitcoin futures. 114
Most futures contracts have margin in the single digits.115
Reducing margin would make bitcoin less expensive to trade and
thus more appealing, but it might also mean introducing risks to
CME's clearing system. Therefore, margin requirements can offset
the risk of default.
4. Guarantee Funds. Further financial buffers exist in the
guarantee funds of the clearinghouses, which are drawn upon to
cover bad trades. 116 These clearinghouses require such funds from
9650-9cOad2d7c5b5 [https:Hlperma.cc/XWY8-S38C]; see also supra text accompanying note
70.
109. Anita K. Krug, Uncertain Futures in Evolving Financial Markets, 93 WASH. U. L.
REv. 1209, 1259 & n.271 (2016).
110. Id. at 1213, 1230.
111. See Allen, supra note 53, at 1088 n.30.
112. Id. at 1088-89.
113. Id.
114. John McCrank et al., Bitcoin Futures Contracts at CME and Cboe, REUTERS (Dec.
15, 2017, 1:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-bitcoin-futures-contracts/bitcoin-
futures-contracts-at-cme-and-cboe-idUSKBN1E92K9 [https://perma.cc/ZXN9-SLRT].
115. Gregory Meyer et al., Bitcoin Futures Face Safeguards to Tackle Wild Gyrations,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.ft.com/contentt4bbflef6-ca4a-1le7-abl8-
7a9fb7d6163e [https:/perma.cc/GJ8D-UHN9].
116. Allen writes:
In the case of [LCH] member default, the order of funds used to cover the
default is the following: the initial margin, the member's default fund
contribution, LCH's own capital (up to £20 million), the remaining default fund,
SwapClear contributions (in the case of a member of one specific product,
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their clearing members.11 7 Often, clearinghouses design "the
default fund to cover potential market risk over and above initial
margin in stressed conditions following a clearing member
default."11 8
"[I]f the clearinghouse is not sufficiently capitalized, the
chances of insolvency increase."'1 9 Setting appropriate collateral
and capital requirements is thus an important process that
ultimately determines the clearinghouse's ability to contain a
member default. 120 It will remain to be seen "[w]hether existing
derivatives clearinghouses will continue to maintain sufficient
collateral, capital, and default fund requirements" in light of the
riskiness of bitcoin futures.121 There is also a moral hazard
problem with using the same guarantee fund for bitcoin futures as
other futures, with the incentive for bitcoin futures to take
advantage of the safety net by taking excessive risk.122
To minimize the risk of clearinghouse insolvency stemming
from bitcoin futures, separate guarantee funds can be introduced
for these trades. This would ensure that only parties that trade
bitcoin futures would be financially responsible for contributing to
SwapClear, which clears interest rates swaps, LCH has the right to request £50
million from each remaining SwapClear member on a nonvoluntary basis), and
finally the remainder of LCH's capital.
Allen, supra note 53, at 1089 n.36 (footnote omitted).
117. Jerry Markham, Custodial Requirements for Customer Funds, 8 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 92, 128 (2013). In addition, "[e]xchanges that earn revenues in excess of
costs typically invest these surpluses in guarantee funds or the exchange clearinghouse to
be used only in the event of a default on futures contracts. Exchange assets are distributed
to members only upon dissolution of the exchange." Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial
Exchange Organization, 43 J. L. & ECON. 437, 459 (2000).
118. Allen, supra note 53, at 1089. There could also be an insurance scheme or self-
insurance scheme, and there have even been discussions of third-party reinsurers. See,
e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Insuring Against a Derivative Disaster: The Case for Decentralized Risk
Management, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1575, 1606, 1611-24 (2013). Although this has been rejected
before, it could serve a role given the riskiness of bitcoin futures.
In 1985, the CFTC staff found that failures by FCMs had increased since the
CFTC's prior report on account insurance. Twenty-four FCMs failed during that
period with losses averaging $2 million annually. Nevertheless, the estimated
losses from FCM bankruptcies between 1938 and 1985 amounted to less than $10
million, and no action was taken by the CFTC to seek additional legislation for
account insurance.
Markham, supra note 117, at 127-28 (footnotes omitted).
119. Allen, supra note 53, at 1092. See Yesha Yadav, Clearinghouses and Regulation
by Proxy, 43 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 165 (2014).
120. Allen, supra note 53, at 1092.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1087 n.25 ("Scholars have also expressed concern about incentive problems
resulting from mandatory clearing of financial products, distinct from those explained in
this Note, relating to moral hazard and excessive risk taking." (citation omitted)).
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its guarantee fund. 123 This risk-minimizing approach would
address clearing members' concern that even if they do not deal in
bitcoin futures, they will be forced to cover any losses should a
counterparty to a bitcoin futures contract default.
CME Clearing already has two independent guarantee funds
and financial safeguard waterfalls: one for Interest Rate Swaps
(IRS), and one for futures and cleared OTC products other than
IRS (the Base Guaranty Fund).124 This structure precludes
commingling because "[t]he contributions from one waterfall
cannot be used to cure losses in a different waterfall."125 Bitcoin
futures are currently part of the Base waterfall, but to minimize
risk and contagion, they can be separated from the existing
waterfalls to minimize risk.
5. Stress Testing. The idea of stress testing, a category of
regulation, is not new. 26 The health of much of the financial
sector, including banks, has been left to stress testing. 27 Stress
123. Markham notes:
Presumably, a customer guaranty fund would operate in much the same manner
but would be in addition to the clearinghouse funds. What is unanswered is
whether the customer guaranty fund would be firm-specific or industry-wide. It
would, in any event, probably be financed through transaction fees paid by
customers as they trade.
Markham, supra note 117, at 128.
124. CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH. GRP., CME CLEARING RISK MANAGEMENT AND
FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS 3, 12 (2018), http://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/files/financialsaf
eguards.pdf [https:Hperma.cc/23CC-LKGB].
125. Id. at 3.
126. Weber writes about stress testing:
Although stress analysis is a parvenu in the bank regulatory regime, it has
a long history in the engineering field from as early as the sixteenth century.
These early stress testing methodologies evolved into professional norms on the
part of engineers to remain focused on worst-case scenarios when designing and
building structures, materials, and systems. Financial firms have adopted an
extensive suite of stress testing techniques alongside their risk management
systems.
Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 2236, 2324-25 (2014).
127. Behzad Gohari & Karen E. Woody, The New Global Financial Regulatory Order:
Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another Global Financial Disaster?, 40 J. CORP.
L. 403, 420-22 (2015). However, there are criticisms of stress testing. For example:
First, the various capital adequacy and liquidity ratio scenarios that were used in
the initial round of stress tests were criticized as being too lenient and thus able
to produce a false positive. Second, the macroeconomic indicator assumptions
about the scenarios that these entities may face were also criticized as too
optimistic, further exacerbating the problem of test validity. Third, choosing
which institutions need to be tested is a tacit admission of their importance to the
macroeconomic health of the country, and, as such, enshrines their status as "too
big to fail."
Id. at 432-33. Methodological issues include claims that the tests are not adverse enough
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testing examines the performance of the regulated entity in
hypothetical, challenging circumstances. 128
Bank stress testing is performed under the authority of the
Dodd-Frank Act and is based on hypotheticals set by government
regulators. 129 Specifically, financial system modeling allows the
introduction of variables that approximate various adverse
economic developments, allowing an assessment of results if the
system were under stress. 130
There have been several issues regarding stress testing since
its rise as a major indicator of a financial institution's health. For
example, one commentator has criticized the regulation-by-
hypothetical regime, namely by stress tests and living wills, 131 and
others have suggested it must be either abandoned or
strengthened because of its current flaws.1 32 Methodological
issues include whether the tests are adverse enough or too
and are too narrowly focused both on a single static point in time and single data point.
Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1247, 1251, 1297, 1299
(2014).
128. "LCH's stress testing for the default fund creates a concrete example of the
complexity involved in managing risk." Allen, supra note 53, at 1091.
LCH uses a stress-testing model that uses around sixty scenarios representing
stressed conditions in the key contracts cleared by LCH. The scenarios are mostly
based on historical events, such as Hurricane Katrina and the largest moves
historically both up and down in specific contracts; however, the model also
includes some theoretical scenarios.
Id. at 1089 n.34.
129. Clark and Ryu write about stress tests:
[T] he genesis of the current supervisory stress tests and CCAR dates back to early
2009, when supervisors conducted simultaneous stress tests of the 19 largest U.S.
BHCs (the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program or SCAP) in the midst of the
financial crisis.
.... [T]he SCAP stress test assessed potential losses and capital shortfalls at the
19 large BHCs under a uniform scenario that was, by design, even more severe
than the expected outcome at that time.
Tim P. Clark & Lisa H. Ryu, CCAR and Stress Testing as Complementary Supervisory
Tools, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.govfbankinforeg/ccar-
and-stress-testing-as-complementary-supervisory-tools.htm [https://perma.cc8P42-3YMV]
(last updated June 24, 2015).
130. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
§ 165, 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2012));
Margaret Ryznar et al., Implementing Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing, 14 DEPAUL Bus. &
COM. L.J. 323, 329-30 (2016).
131. Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against the Dodd-Frank Act's Living Wills:
Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 29, 66, 75-76
(2012).
132. Baradaran, supra note 127, at 1325-26. See also Jonathan C. Lipson, Against
Regulatory Displacement: An Institutional Analysis of Financial Crises, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
673, 723-24 (2015) ("While stress tests and living wills are laudable, they seem unlikely to
overcome the uncertainty and complexity of Dodd-Frank's resolution regime, and the
incentive effects it will have on potential pre-failure negotiations.").
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narrowly focused both on a single static point in time and single
data point.133  There have been some concerns caused by the
consistently positive results delivered by stress tests.
134
When the government conducts what it claims to be a
rigorous stress test of a bank and then gives that bank a
clean bill of health, the market receives a signal not only that
the bank's risks are well managed but also that the
government itself will stand behind the bank if the
assessment proves incorrect. 135
There is an additional risk in these stress tests that the model
used does not accurately reflect all possible outcomes. Any sort of
model requires justification of why certain variables are in the
model and what values are used for the variables. 136 Otherwise,
the model does not accurately reflect reality, which is called "model
risk."1 37 Model risk is managed by model validation, which is the
effective and independent challenge of each model's conceptual
soundness and control environment. 138
Despite these drawbacks, stress testing can be used in the
bitcoin context by stress testing bitcoin-futures positions at the
clearinghouses. 139 A failed stress test would raise concerns about
whether a firm or clearinghouse has enough capital to stay solvent
in case of a default.
6. Hacking Concerns. The essence of cryptocurrency is its
digital nature, which raises cybersecurity issues such as the theft
of bitcoin and software hacking.1 40 In 2014, Bitcoin hacking
bankrupted a leading exchange in Japan called Mt. Gox, with
approximately half-a-billion dollars in bitcoin (850,000 bitcoin)
stolen. 141 While 200,000 bitcoin were recovered within six months,
133. Baradaran, supra note 127, at 1297-99.
134. See id. at 1287-88, 1297-99.
135. Id. at 1252.
136. See Edward L. Pittman, Quantitative Investment Models, Errors, and the Federal
Securities Laws, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 633, 719 (2017); Ryznar et al., supra note 130, at
326.
137. Pittman, supra note 136, at 648, 653-54, 713.
138. See id.
139. See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Announces
Clearinghouse Liquidity Stress Test Results (Oct. 16, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoo
mlPressReleases/pr7630-17 [https://perma.cc/C4S2-W55K].
140. See Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A
Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 837, 855-58 (2015)
(exploring the risks generated by Bitcoin's most basic features, which include its status as
software, its decentralized structure, its open-source software development process, and its
expertise problem).
141. Misha Tsukerman, The Block Is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation
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their dollar value sunk by the revelation of weak security, and the
incident showed that hacks impact bitcoin's trading price.
Exchange customers had no remedy. 142
Bitcoin is susceptible to hacking because its anonymity
obscures its custody and ownership. In contrast, it is harder to
steal stock because it has more of an ownership record.143
Furthermore, there is no central ownership or management of
bitcoin that will address any problems.1 44 This increases the risk
level related to bitcoin futures, with the potential to impact the
broader financial market. As a result, cybersecurity issues
surrounding bitcoin should be considered in any potential
regulatory scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent emergence of bitcoin futures poses unique risks to
the economy, raising questions of regulation. The potential
regulatory regime for bitcoin futures includes position limits and
stress testing.
Some observers think bitcoin will fail before a regulatory
approach can develop. Indeed, bitcoin has its shortcomings that
might slow its growth, including the length to process
transactions, high fees, and volatility. Perhaps new products will
replace bitcoin.
The future is unclear about what new products will be coming
next, but lessons from bitcoin apply to other cryptocurrencies and
similar ventures. 45 While products may be new, their risks are
old. These familiar risks should be addressed in order to minimize
the chance of a financial crisis.
and Suggestions for the Future, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127, 1149-50 (2015).
142. Jason S. Seligman, Cyber Currency: Legal and Social Requirements for Successful
Issuance Bitcoin in Perspective, 9 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 263, 264 (2015).
143. See supra Part II.
144. See id.
145. Annie Massa, CAME Takes Cautious Stance Toward Crypto-Futures Besides
Bitcoin, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
01/cme-takes-cautious-stance-toward-crypto-futures-besides-bitcoin [https://perma.ccNQ9
U-SJMJ] ("CME Group Inc. doesn't plan to offer futures based on cryptocurrencies other
than Bitcoin any time soon, in contrast to rival Cboe Global Markets Inc.'s openness to the
idea."). Indeed, bitcoin is currently the most dominant currency among over 500 virtual
currencies. Trautman & Harrell, supra note 44, at 1097.
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